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In this paper, a firm maximizes profits over choices of wage schedules,
hiring schedules, pension schedules and mandatory retirement ages in a nodel
with tumover costs a,nd a productivity function which depends upon position and
experience. It is shown that firms may have reason to institute a mandatory
retirenent age and that they can accomplish the sane goal through proper uses
of wage and pension schedules.

Steve stem, "Pronotion and Mandatory Retirenent."

PrODOtion am Mardatory RetirEDEllt*

Section I:

Introduction

Over the last twenty years, there has been nuch discussion in the nedia and
in Congress concerning mandatory retirerrent.
back the mininum mandatory retirement age.

Congress has progressively pushed
At this tirre, alrrost all enployees

are protected against mandatory retirerrent until the age of seventy by the Age
Discrimination in Enployment Act (ADEA) • The major exenption in the ADEA is
for errployees in bona-fide executive positions. A firm is allowed to force
executives to retire so that:
1)

the firm can bring in "new blood" to maintain the inflow of new ideas,
and

2)

the firm can provide younger enployees with prorrotion opportunities.

There are those in Congress who are now suggesting a total ban on mandatory
retirement.
Many arguments have been suggeste:1 fo.r the existence of mandatory
retirenent:
1)

Enployees becorre less productive in their sixties, and the
productivity of individual workers is difficult to rreasure.

Age is

used as a proxy for productivity, and enployees are fire:1 when their
estimated productivity is below their wage.
2)

Enployees becorre less productive in their sixties, and they prefer to
retire with a "gold watch" at a cornrron age than to be fired or receive
a wage reduction individually after being identified as less
productive.

3)

Mandatory retirement makes it easier for firrrs to corrply with
affirmative action requirenents.

The author wishes to thank Bill Johnson, Paul Schultz, Joyce Cooper and
workshop participants at Yale University and the University of Virginia for
helpful comrrents. All remaining errors are mme.
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4)

Both the firm and the- employee benefit if some portion of wage
payments are deferred until late in the employee's career.

This

implies that an employee will be paid more than his marginal product
late in his career.

He must be terminated at some point so that the

net present value of his lifetime wage payments equals the net
present value of his lifetime marginal product.

5)

Mandatory

retirement creates room for promotion of younger employees •

...
The first and second arguments assume that older employees become less
productive. The problem with these arguments is that they require the firm to
fire employees with a positive marginal product rather than to just lower
their wages.

Some suggest that setting an arbitrary mandatory retirement date

improves morale relative to lowering wages.

However, it is not clear that

firing an employee under any conditions improves morale relative to lowering
his wage.

Furthermore, there is some evidence [see Clark, Kreps and Spengler

(1978)] that older employees are not less productive on average.

The

screening problem may present an explanation for mandatory retirement if there
is adverse selection [see Greenwald (1979) for example].
potential problem at all ages.

But this is a

Why aren't younger employees also subject to a

screening problem with adverse selection?
Mandatory retirement may increase the effect of affirmative action
programs.

However, to the extent that affirmative action programs are short

term programs, this argument does not present a good reason on which to base
long term decisions.

Besides, mandatory retirement existed decades before

affirmative action programs did.
The moral hazard argument for mandatory retirement has been suggested by
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Lazear in a series of papers.
employee relationship is

Lazear (1979) suggests that the employer

fraught

with moral hazard problems which can be

solved optimally by deferring some portion of wage payments until late in an
employee's career while maintaining the present value of an employee's stream
of earnings.

Both the finn and its employee prefer such an arrangement.

However, this means that the employee will be paid more than his marginal
product late in his life and will retire later than he would have had wage
payments not been deferred.

Thus, a mandatory retirement program becomes

necessary to force the employee to retire at his optimal retirement age.
Lazear (1983) shows that early retirement benefits may be viewed as severance
pay to emp1oyees who are earning more than thei r ma rgi na1 product. The value
of the early retirement benefit is equal to the value of a normal retirement
pension plus any rents ·the employee would have earned had he stayed at the
firm until the mandatory retirement age.
There are many problems with Lazear's analysis.

First of all, the high

incidence of early retirement is not consistent with his analysis.

Lazear

(1983} shows that the fiMn may offer early retirement benefits to employees to

induce them to retire early.

However, this argument has no explanatory power

since both the firm and its employees are indifferent between the employee
retiring early or at the mandatory retirement age.

In fact, the existence of

adverse selection would make early retirement benefits unprofitable to the
firm.

Furthermore, employees who retire early in Lazear's model should find

another job.

In the real worlq, many early retirees do not find new jobs.

Second, the purpose of deferring wage payments is to induce employees not
to shirk or steal from the finn...
11

11

11

If an employee is caught shirking, he is

fired immediately and forfeits any future rents.
of shirking is a stock.

The return to the employee

If it were not a stock, no one would ever have
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incentive to shirk whether or not wages were deferred.

But, since it is a

stock, at some point arbitrari ly close to the mandatory retirement age, all
employees should shirk because the value of a finite stock is always greater
than the value of a finite flow over a short enough time period.
A pension program can be instituted with pensions payable only to
employees who reach the mandatory retirement age. This would provide the firm
with a method of preventing employees from shirking arbitrari ly close to the
mandatory retirement age.

However, only benefits that are available to only

those··who leave the firm at the mandatory retirement age serve ~his role.
These are called supplementary benefits and do not receive the same tax
advantages as regular benefits covered by ERISA.
sample provided supplementary benefits. 1

Only 7"1. of firms in a large

In Lazear's model, the firm could replace a mandatory retirement age with
a "recontra cting age 11 at which point wages would be readjusted to the
employee's marginal product.

The optimal mandatory retiremen t age is set so

that if employees were given a chance to recontrac t they would decline to do
so. However, there is much evidence that many workers accept other jobs at
lower pay when forced to retire from their career job [see Schulz (1985), and
Gustman and Steinmeier {1984)].
The focus of this paper is the promotions argument.

It is suggested that

the firm may force its older employees to retire in order to open up promotion
possibili ties for younger employees.

In a survey of firm managers, it was

found that 67% of managers felt that •mandatory retirement [was] necessary to
create job openings and promotion opportuni ties for younger people." 2 This
reason was cited more frequently than any other reason.
The production function of the firm is such that the marginal
productiv ity of each employee net of training costs depends upon both the
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employee's experience and his position.
hierarchy of the firm.

Employees are promoted through the

Promotion is based upon seniority or experi~nce. Many

papers in the economics literature discuss why promotion would be based upon
seniority.

These include Carmichael (1983), Ioannides and Pissarides (1983)

and Rosen {l982}e Most of these papers have a comparative advantage argument
in them.

Actually, it is not necessary for any of the results of this model

for promotion to be based on seniority.

The firm maximizes profits subject to

choices of a wage schedule, a pension program, a hiring schedule and a
manda'tory retirement age.

It is shown that the firm chooses a ~inite

mandatory retirement age in many cases.

Furthermore, it is shown that

pensions may play a role in subverting the spirit of ADEA but play no other
role in firm policy when there are perfect capital markets and no tax
distortions .

Furthermore, it is shown that the relationship between marginal

product and wage may be very tenuous in management positions.

Finally, it is

shown that firms may discriminate against older potential employees because it
is difficult to recuperate hiring costs.
It is assumed that there is a firm with a hierarchy of jobs. Jobs are
ranked by productivity and then dispersed to employees in order of
experience.

The position each employee gets is a function of what percentage

of the other employees have less experience. The wage is quoted as a function
of position and experience.
The distribution of experience at a firm is a function of the exit rate
from the firm at all ages, the hiring rate at all ages and the mandatory
retirement age.

If the exit rate rises, the hiring rate falls or the

mandatory retirement age falls, then employees rise more quickly through the
hierarchy of the firm.
Each employee decides when to leave the firm by comparing the present
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value of staying at the finn to opportunities outside of the finn.

It is

assumed that the distribution of alternative opportunities can be summarized
in a sufficient statistic which is the reservation value.

If the value of

staying is less than the reservation value, then all employees leave
immediately.

When the average value of staying is greater than the average

value of leaving, the exit behavior of employees depends upon unspecified
characteristics of the market.

It can be shown that under many diverse assumptions about the exit rate
and wage schedule, the fi nn will maximize the present value of~ prospective
employee's staying by instituting a mandatory retirement program.

This occurs

even though the prospective employee knows he will be retired at the mandatory
retirement age.
However, the goa1 of the firm is not to maximize the net present va1ue of
staying for its youngest employees.

First of all, it is interested in the

present value of staying for all its employees.
interested in maximizing its own profits.

Secondly, it is really only

To the extent that maximi~ing the

net present value of stayin,g for its employees contributes to maximum profits,
it follows the interests of its employees.

But there will be some competing

interests between the firm and its employees.
The finn maximizes profits over choices of wage schedules, pension
schedules, hiring schedules and mandatory retirement ages.

It takes into

account how its choices affect the exit behavior of its employees which in
turn affects profits.

The exit behavior of employees and the hiring schedule

determine promotion possibilities, the productivity of its employees and the
absolute size of the firm.

In deciding upon a mandatory retirement age, the

firm considers the wage and marginal product of its oldest employees.

But it

also considers how its oldest employees' leaving will affect the exit rate of
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its other employees, and it discounts the marginal product of its oldest
employees by how effective ly younger empl_oyees can replace the oldest
employees.

Section II:

The Firm's Problem

The firm has a production function such that it divides up its labor
force·· into a continuum of positions refe'renced by G e [0,1], i.e., 1006% of
the labor force has a position worse than G. The productiv ity of an employee
with general experience tin position G is p(G,t) where Pi l_ 0 and p l, O.
2
p(G,t) is determined by the exogenous production function. p(G,t) is net of
any training costs.
The firm has a work force with a distributi on of experience, H(t). H(t)
is determined by the exit rate of employees from the firm and the rate at
which employees are hired for different positions .
Let X(t) be the exit rate of employees with t years of experience. Then
the survivor probabi 1i ty for emp 1oyees who joined the firm with no experience,
E(t), is:

(2.1)

E(t) = exp{-

f6

X(u)du}

and the survivor probabili ty for employees who joined the firm withs years of
experience is E(t)/E(s) .
Let Z(t) be the cumulative distributi on function for the number of
employees hired with t years of experience.

For example, if all employees are

hired with no experience, then Z{t) = 1, Vt > O. The densi.ty function for
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the distribution of employees by experience, H{t), is:
h(t)

(2.2)

f~ E(t)Z'(s)ds/E(s

) __
= _ _ ___.__ _

f~ f~
t

=

E(u)Z'(s}dsdu/E(s)

~
rrsrand

E(t)D(t)
J~ E(u)D{u)du

where

O(t)

retired.

The numerator is the proportion of employees that started t-s years

= J

0

~

is the first age at which all employees have

ago who are still working for the firm, summed overs.

The denominator is the

proportion of employees that started u-s years ago who are still working for
the firm, summed over u and s. 3
...
The firm promotes employees strictly on the basis of seniority.

It does

this because more experienced employees have a comparative advantage in senior
positions.

The firm's promotion policy implies that G = H(t).

The firm must choose a personnel policy consisting of four components.
The first component is the wage schedule, w(G,t}.

Since G = H(t},

w(G,t)

= w(H(t),t} = W(t}.

p(t).

p(t) is the present value of the stream of benefits an employee would

The second component is a pension schedule,

receive from the firm if he left after accumulating t years of experience.
W(t) and p(t) constitute total compensation paid to employees.
The third component is the hiring schedule, Z(t).
only from within, Z(t)

=

1

V t1_0

and Z'(t}

=

0

If the firm promotes

Vt> O. If the firm hires

from without for position G = H{t), then Z'(H- 1(G)} > O.
The last component is a mandatory retirement age,~, at which all
remaining employees are forced to leave the firm.

It is possible that~ is

large enough so that all employees have voluntarily retired by~.

The focus

of this paper is the determination of~, the mandatory retirement age.
The qoal of the firm is to maximize long term profits,

J~

e-rsl(W,p,Z,~)d s where L{W,p,Z,~) is the profit earned by the firm at time
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s.

L(W,p,Z,~) depends upon the wage schedule, W, the pension schedule, p, the

hiring schedule, Z, and the mandatory retirement age,~. in effect at time
s.

If the firm is in a steady state, then L does not depend upon time;

maximizing long term profits is equivalent to maximizing instantaneous
profits, l.
It is necessary to determine what instantaneous profits are.

(2.3}

D(t)

=

let:

f~ Z'(s)ds/E(s)
...

so that E(t)D(t) is the number of employees with t years of experience.
Instantaneous profits made on employees with t years of experience are:

(2.4)

[p(H(t),t) - W{t) - ~(t)p(t)]E{t)D( t) •

The firm also hires some new employees with t years of experience and incurs
hiring costs of S*(t). Thus total instantaneous profits are:

(2.5)

l{w,p,Z,~)

Section III:

=

J~[(p(H(t),t) - W(t) - ~(t)p(t))E(t)D( t)

Employee Behavior

The firm needs to maximize L(W,p,Z,~) over choices of W, p, Zand~.
However, it is constrained by how its decisions affect the exit rate of its
employees and the cost of hiring new employees.

If employees consider the
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value of leaving the finn to be greater than the value of staying, they will
leave.

Fu~thermore, a new employee will only join the firm if the value of

accepting a job is greater than the value of rejecting it.
let V(t) be the average value to a worker with t years of experience of
being employed at the firm.

Let V*(t) be the average value to a worker with t

years of experience of not being employed at the firm.

If workers are

homogeneous, then the value of staying and leaving for each worker are V(t)
and V*{t) respectively.

If workers are heterogeneous with respect to outside

opportunities, then the values of staying and leaving vary by worker and V{t)
and V*{t) are only sufficient statistics for the distribution of values of
staying and leaving.
The value of leaving the firm, V*{t), is a function of market wages, the
cost of search, the value of leisure and the value of any income contingent on
not working {e.g., Social Security payments and unemployment insurance).
is assumed that at some senior age, V*(t} increases rapidly.

It

This represents

the cost of foregone Social Security payments and the increasing disutility of
work caused by failing health.
The value of staying at the firm, V{t), is a function of future wage and
pension payments, V*(t), the exit rate and the mandatory retirement date:

(3.1)

V(t) =

[J;

e-r(u-t){W(u) + A(u)(V*(u) + p(u)))E(u)du

+

e-r(~-t)E(~){V*(~)

+

p(~))]/E(t)

which satisfies the differential equation:

(3.2)

v· (t)

=

rV(t) - W{t) - A(t){V*{t)

+

p(t) - V(t)) •
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Equation (3.2) states that V(t) changes over experience by the return-on
future wages minus the wages paid at t and the value of lost opportunities
that occurred at t.

Whether V(t) and V*(t) are the values of staying and

leaving or just the average values of staying and leaving, equation (3.2)
holds.
Exit rates are determined by each employee deciding when is the optimal
time for him to 1eave the firm.

If employees are homogeneous with respect to

the value of staying and leaving, then there is some time; t*, such that the
exit" rate is >..(t) = O fort < t* and >..(t\!r) = ....

If employees a.&'e

heterogeneous, then >..(t) is a function of V(t) and V*(t):

(3.3)

>..(t) = A(V(t},V*(t))

o

It is assumed that A1 i O and A2 l, O, that there is some V*(t) such that if
V(t} < V*(t) then >..(t} ='"',and that >..(t) l O when V(t} <....
The cost of hiring employees with t years of experience, S*(t) is also a
function of V{t) and V*(t):

(3.4}

S*(t} = S(V(t),V*(t)}.

s1 .5._ O and s2 l. O. In other words, the greater the value

It is assumed that

of joining the firm is relative to not joining, the less it costs the firm to
find new employees.
The firm's problem can be written as:

{3.5)

max

w,o,z,.

L(W,p,Z,.)

=

f~

[(p(H(t),t) - W(t)

12

- A(t)p(t))E( t)D(t) - S(V(t),V*(t))Z 1 (t)]dt

subject to

(3.6)

H'(t) = h(t) ,

(3. 7)''

D'(t) = Z'{t)/E(t) ,

(3.8)

(3.9)

-E'(t)/E(t) = A(t) ,

(3.10)

A(t) = 6{V{t),V*{t)), and

{3.11)

V'(t) = rV(t) - W(t) - l(t)(V*(t)

+

p(t) - V(t)) •

This is a standard calculus of variations problem which can be solved with the
standard techniques.
In the next three sections, this problem is solved in increasing
generality.

Section IV contains a simple case in order to builrl intuition.

Section V adds enough detail to allow for a discussion of the role of pensions
and turnover costs. Section VI is the most general case and allows for a
discussion of discrimination in hiring against older workers.
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· Section IV:

Homogeneous Employees

Assume that all employees face the same V{t) and V*(t) schedule.
implies that there is some time,

(4 .. 1)

0

if

t('t

...

if

t =

't,

This

such that:

;\.(t) =
'to

4

...
't

may be the age when V(t) < V*(t) for the first time or it may be the

mandatory retirement age.

In this example, the firm does not need an explicit

mandatory retirement age; it can induce a11 employees to retire at any
particular age by just reducing total compensation enough so that it is in
each employee's interest to leave.
Furthermore, assume that:

S*

(4.2)

t

= 0

and V(O) > V*{O}

S*{t) =
..,

otherwise

It is obvious that the firm should only promote from within, i.e., Z(t)
Vt> O.

=

1

Furthermore, the firm should set total compensation for each cohort

so that V(t}

=

V*(t} until some time,

't,

that it wants employees to leave.

Let W*(t} be the total minimum compensation necessary to keep V{t) l_ V*(t).
Since V(t) = V*(t) until
until

't

and then leave.

't,

all employees remain with the firm

Thus the survivor function is:
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{4.3)

E{t)

1

t

< 't'

0

t

> 't'.

=

This implies that the distribu tion of employees by experience is
H(t)

=

t/~ forte [O,'t'].

The firm has already picked the optimal hiring schedule and total
compensation schedule. It only needs to pick an optimal mandatory retireme nt
age: ''

(4.4)

...

max L('t') =

J~ (P(t,

t) - W*(t))dt - S*

~

The optimal mandatory retirement age is at the ·age when:

(4.5)
which is equivale nt to:

Equation (4.6) says that the firm should set the mandatory retirement age at
the age when the total compensation necessary to keep the oldest employee is
equal to the average product of all of its employees plus the gains to a more
experienced workforce.

The necessary second order condition is that W*{t) is

rising faster than the right hand side of equation (4.6) at~.
The first and second order conditions for a finite mandatory retireme nt
age should be met if W*(t) rises fast enough.

Furthermore, the optimal
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mandatory retirement age is likely to be at age- 65 if V*{t) rises
discontinuously at that age because of the earninqs test for collecting Social
Security benefits.
If p2 = 0, i.e., there are no productiv ity gains to experience, then the
mandatory retirement age is the age when total compensation is equal to
average product. This occurs even though the oldest employee's product is
p{l) which is greater than the average product.

Since all employees would be

as effective as the oldest in the top position, the loss of the top employee
When p2 > ·o, there is an added c05t to firing
However, there is still no reason why W*{'t') is equal to

is only the average product.
the oldest employee.

the product of the oldest employee.
Up until now it has been assumed that the firm hires one unit of
employeeso Another possible reasonable assumption would be that it maintains
a total workforce of one unit. Let employees be hi red at the rate a. The
total workforce is then:

(4.7)

~

I~

E(t)dt

which in this example is equal to «'t'.

In order to maintain a workforce of

size 1, the firm must hire new employees at the rate,

maximization problem becomes:

{4.8)

max L('t')
't'

=

l't [J0't p(l,
't'

which has an optimum when:

t) - W*(t))dt - S*]

The firm's

16

The difference between the highest wage and the average wage must equal the
gains to increased experience plus the reduction in hiring costs.

The rest of

the intuition from the problem holding the number of employees hired fixed is
the same.

Section V:

Heterogeneous Employees

· Assume that employees are heterogeneous with respect to outside
opportunities. Thus:

(5.1)

X(t) = b(V(t),V*(t)).

b(V(t),V*(t}) is conmon knowledge but-any particular employee's value of
leaving is unknown to the firm.

Further, assume that:

S(V(O), V*(O))
(5.2)

S*(t)

=
a,

Thus Z(t)

=

1

t = 0

t

> o.

Vt 1.. O.

The firm maximizes instantaneous profits by solving a calculus of
variations problem which is developed below.

let x,(t) be the set of dependent

variables:

(5.3)

x,(t) = [H(t), W(t), E(t), X(t), V(t), h(t), p(t)].
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Let:

O(t, x(t), x'(t))

(5.4)

=

[p(H(t),t) - W(t) - A(t)p{t)]E(t)

Then the firm maximizes:

{5.5)

.

L(W,p,~)

= /~

C(t, x(t), x'(t))dt

subject to:

(5.6)

H'(t)

(5.7)

h'(t)/h(t)

(5.8)

-E'{t)/E(t)

(5.9)

A(t)

(5.10)

V'(t)

=

=

=

h{t) ,

=

=

E'(t)/E(t),
A(t) ,

t(V(t),V*(t)), and
rV(t) - W(t) - A(t){V*(t)

+

p(t) - V(t))

and the terminal conditions:

This problem can be written in Lagrangian form as:

~

18

(s.12)

Ht, x;(t), x;'(t)) = o(t, x;(t), x'(t))

+

o1(t)[H'(t) - h(t)J

+ o (t)[h'(t) + X{t)h(t}J
3
+ o (t)[X(t) - ~(V(t},V* (t)}]
5

+

...

o6 (t)[V'(t} - rV(t) + W(t) + X{t){V*(t) + p{t) -_ V(t))] •

First order condition s for an interior solution 5 are 'o~/'ox_ = (d/dt){'o~/ 'ox;'): 6

(H) ,

{5.14)

E= 0
6

(W) ,

(E) ,

(V) ,

(h) , and

19

(5.19)

(p) •

Note that the first order conditions for Wand p, equations (5.14) and

(5.19), are equivalent whenever A> 0, i.e., whenever any employee collects a
pensions

Since there are perfect capital markets, the firm and its employees

are indifferent between the same sets of wage and pension schedules.

Given

any optimal wage and pension schedule, there is ·a continuum of wage and
pension schedules that are as good.

One of them sets p(t) = O.

loss of generality, p(t) is set equal to" zero.

Thus, without

...

The remaining equations can be reduced to four equations in H, >..,
V and W:

(5.20)

H' '/HI = ->.. ,

(5.21)

>.. =

(5.22}

V'

=

ll.(V,V*),

rV - W- >..(V* - V) , and

where A is a constant of integration equal to:
"g'

(5.24)

and c(t)

A= lo E(u)du

=

/~p 2{Hjs)ds is the cumulative value of experience.

terminal conditions that determine the optimal

~

are:

Initial and
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(5.25)

H{'t) = 1,

{5.26)

(5.27)

{5.28)

V(O) + /~ [p(H,u) - W]Edu = V*'(O) -

{5.30)

61

v(o)~V*{O))

...

1 = -S1{V(O),V*{O))

· Equations {5.27) and (5.28) imply that the firm should set a wage
schedule so that all employees retire voluntarily by the mandatory retirement
age.

Technically, no employees should be forced to retire.

However, this

only means that the finn should offer older employees such a low wage that
effectively they are forced to retire. This is analogous to the well known
discussion of the distinction between quits and layoffs.
Equation (5.29) states that the total value of the finn-employee
relationship, the value of the job to the employee plus the profits made on
employees, must equal the value of alternative opportunities with an
adjustment for turnover. This equation determines the optimal mandatory
retirement age as long as the wage necessary to keep any employees rises with
age after some age, t.
Equation (5.30) states that at the optimum, a small increase in the value
of a job at time zero should be just offset by the reduced cost of search.
The ADEA prevents the firm from imposing a mandatory retirement age
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before 70 and from lowering its older employees' wages solely because of
age.

However, ADEA says nothing about pensions.

In fact the early retirement

benefits provided by most pension plans have the same effect as reduced wages;
both can cause employees to retire before the earliest allowed mandatory
retirement age. Thus, a restriction on reducing wages is irrelevant unless
there is also a restriction on total compensation.

Section VI:

Promotion from Outside
...

The firm's problem written in equations (3.5) through (3.11) now is
considered in its complete generality.

However, pension benefits are set

equal to zero since only total compensation matters. 7 The problem is
rewritten for the reader's convenience:

max L(W,Z,-t)

(601)

W,Z,'t'

=

J~[(p(H(t), t) - W(t))E(t)D(t)

- S(V(t),V*( t))Z'(t)]dt
subject to:

(6.2}

H' (t) =

(6.3)

O' (t) = Z' (t)/E{t) ,

(6.4)

:!Lit) = ~J + E'j_tJ
nmU1tJ rm-,

(6 .. 5)

-E'{t)/E(t) = A(t) ,

h(t) ,
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(6.6)

A(t)

(6.7)

V'(t)

=

=

~(V(t),V*(t)) , and

rV{t) - W{t) - A(t)(V*{t) - V{t))

with terminal and initial conditions:

(6.8)

let: ,.

(6.9}

...

~(t} = [H{t), W{t), E(t), k(t}, V(t), Z(t}, D(t}, h(t)J

and:

(6.10)

0{t, x(t), x'(t))

=

[p(H(t},t) - W(t)]E(t)D(t}

- S{V(t),V*(t))Z'(t).

Then the Lagrangian equation is:

(6.11}

,(t), ,t(t), ,):'(t)) = O{t, t(t), !'(t)}

+

o2(t}[E'(t)

+

+ o3(t)[h'(t) -

A(t)E(t)]

~(i)) h(t) + A(t}h(t)]
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+ o6(t)[V'{t) - rV(t) + W(t)

+ A(t)(V*(t) - V(t))].

...
In theory, necessary first order conditions can be taken and solved.

In order

to determine the optimal mandatory retirement age, initial and terminal
conditions 111Jst be taken. · But terminal conditions are only valid if the
interior solution to equation (6.11) is a true optimum.
solution 111Jst have a corner.

In fact, the optimal

There is some age, t* < -&, at which all

employees have been hired; Z{t*)

= 1 and

Z1 (t)

= 0 Vt>- t*.

It can be shown

that t* is at the point where:

S(V{t*),V*{t*)) =

J;* ~

[p(H(s),s) - W(s)]ds

'f
!r1tl_ Is
.
- Jt*
~ 0 p2 (H{x),x)dxds

s

At t*, hiring costs must be equal to the average product of employees with at
least t* years of experience adjusted for gains to experience. After t*,
h;ring costs are greater than can be earned by employees hired at that age.
The firm is only willing to hire new employees older than t* if it can
pay them a lower wage than an employee with the same experience already
hired.

This idea is similar to models of discrimination against women because
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of higher turnover costs.

See Ba.rnes and Jones (1974) or Salop and Salop

(1976).
Since S{V(t),V*{t)) > 0 for all t and the right hand side of equation
(6.31) approaches zero as t* approaches~, there must beat*<~
at which equation (6.31) is satisfied.
similar to that solved in Section V.

At this age, the finn solves a problem
Thus, the optimal mandatory retirement

age already has been characterized for this section.

...
Section VII:

Conclusions

A model of the firm has been presented in which the productivity of its
employees depends on their positions as well as their experience.
employee leaves the firm when it is optimal for him to do so.

Each

It has been

shown that:

1) The optima1 mandatory retirement age is a function .of the reservation
value function, the productivity schedule and the increase to average
productivity of having an older workforce.

2) When capital markets are perfect, for any optimal wage and pension
schedule, there is another wage schedule with no pension benefits
that is as good for both the finn and its employees.

This occurs

because employees can save as effectively as the firm.

3)

Pensions may play a role in inducing employees to retire when there
is a) a ban on mandatory retirement and also b) restrictions on
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lowering older employees' wages.

The firm can reduce the total value

of employment effectively either by reducing wages or by reducing the
present value of pensions.

The firm reduces the present value of

pensions to its oldest employees by providing large early retirement
benefits.

The reduction of the present value of pensions for older

employees has the same effect on employee retirement behavior as wage
reductions would have had they not been illegal •
.,

The wage schedule depends more on an employee's opportunities outside
of the finn than on his marginal product.

It is only in equilibrium

that wage may equal° marginal product.

5) Our Social Security system causes firms to make the mandatory
retirement age 65 and causes many employees to retire before age
65.

The benefits test and early benefits make this happen.

6) Firms discriminate against potential older employees because it is
difficult to reqain hirinq costso

This is even true when the added

benefit of having an older workforce is considered.

Unfortunately, there are some basic questions that this model does not
address.

These include:

1) Why do some firms have a mandatory retirement age while others do
not?
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2) Why is the incidence of mandatory retirement correlated with firm
size?

3) Why is the incidence of mandatory retirement correlated with the
incidence of pension programs?

The answers to these questions depend upon the form of the exit rate function,
the productivity function and the search cost function.
· ihe most intriguing question concerning mandatory retirement is why the
great majority of firms with a mandatory retirement program have a mandatory
retirement age of 65.

Both Lazear (1979) and this paper suggest that the

Social Security earnings test causes this.

But, it is not clear that such a

result would follow if employees were heterogeneous.

For example, in a model

with heterogeneous ability we might observe the existence of a tenure age as
exists in universities and many law firms or even multi-tiered tenure
structures as exists in the armed forces.

This is a topic for future

research.
It is too early to derive any policy implications from this model.

It is

clear that older workers are discriminated against both because they are fired
at a somewhat arbitrary age independent of their ability to work and because
they have a difficult time finding new jobs. This model presents some reasons
that firms discriminate against older workers.

It implies that it may be

Pareto optimal to allow for such discrjmination.
firms that have no mandatory retirement age.

However, there are many

Before evaluating the value of

mandatory retirement programs we also must understand why some firms do not
have mandatory retirement programs.
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Footnotes

1.

See Kotlikoff and Smith (1983) for this data.

2.

Wi 11 i am Mercer-Mendi nger, Inc.,

11

Empl oyer Attitudes Toward Mandatory

Retirement,N New York, 1977, page 6.
3.

For example, let Z(t)

if t =

(2.2a)

t _?_ 0 and:

= 1,

"t'

ift<i:
...

Then E(t) = 1 if t <-,; and E(t) = 0 if t

{2.2b)

h(t) = 1/f~ E(u)du

l

i:.

h{t) is equal to:

- -'t1

and H(t) = t/i;, which is the uniform distribution with bounds [O, i;].

4.

5o

The flavor of the results would not change if A(t) = { :

l

O

t=-,;

The optimal solution to the firm's problem must be an interior solution

between O and-,;.

The only variables that could possibly have corner solutions

are A, E, W,

p

assumption.

V(t) can never fall below V*{t) and V(t) can only diverge to•

and V.

If A(t) =•then t = i:.

A(t) > 0 when V(t) <•by

if future total compensation diverges to infinity.
money by providing such high total compensation.

But the firm would lose
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6.

The independent variable, t, is implic~t.

7. Another reason to drop pensions is that it does not make sense to pay two
employees who leave at the same time the same pension benefit if they started
at different times.
insight.

To correct for this problem is too difficult and adds no
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